《欧盟-乌克兰联合协定》下的争端解决机制简介

打官司找张雷律师 张雷律师 普法天天讲 北京张雷律师 

一、介绍

《欧盟-乌克兰联合协定》（以下简称“《联合协定》”）被广泛认为是“欧盟与非成员国订立的最具雄心的协议”。
其中，“深入和全面自由贸易区（DCFTA）”具有尤其重要的意义，它是《欧盟-乌克兰联合协定》的组成部分，通过具有法律约束力的近似立法承诺，将欧盟与乌克兰之间旨在尽可能实现高度自由化的所有贸易涵盖在内。
DCFTA的其中一项最重要的横向机制（horizontal mechanisms）是争端解决机制（DSM）。本文将对DCFTA争端解决机制进行分析，并将这种新的争端解决机制与WTO下广泛使用的争端解决机制进行对比并分析其异同。
二、《欧盟-乌克兰联合协定》中争端解决机制的一般规定
争端解决机制是《欧盟-乌克兰联合协定》总框架的一个组成部分，因双方所作承诺的范围和性质将不可避免地出现分歧，因而将该机制纳入协定至关重要。国际贸易规则在得到适当适用时显然是有效的，因此，大多数贸易协定都规定了争端解决机制，以确保协定的执行和争端的有效解决。
几乎所有自由贸易协定（FTA）在实践中都依赖于以下其中一种解决争端机制：（1）外交协商和解；（2）常设仲裁庭裁决；（3）世界贸易组织（WTO）模式，成立一个专门小组审理和裁决争端。
目前占主导地位的FTA争端解决模式以WTO争端解决机制（最初根据《关贸总协定》制定）为基础。WTO争端解决程序树立了各国政府对贸易协定中可靠的争端解决和执行制度的期望。因此，FTA谈判经常以类WTO制度作为FTA争端解决机制的基础。
《欧盟-乌克兰DCFTA》的争端解决机制的目标很明确：“避免并真诚地解决双方之间的任何争端，并尽可能达成双方同意的解决方案”。
首先需要指出的是，就有关《欧盟-乌克兰联合协定》非DCFTA条款的解释和适用的争端，《欧盟-乌克兰联合协定》第477条规定了标准的争端解决机制。该机制规定，联合理事会可以通过作出有约束力的裁定协商解决争端。如果联合理事会不能在三个月期限内达成协议，申请人可以采取“适当措施”。《欧盟-乌克兰联合协定》第478条规定，在选择适当措施时，应优先考虑对实施《联合协定》干扰最小的措施。此类措施不得包括中止《欧盟-乌克兰DCFTA》规定的任何权利或义务。
《欧盟-乌克兰联合协定》争端解决中最具创新性和先进性的内容涉及争端解决的方式对DCFTA规定的解释和适用。事实上，第四编第14章规定了新的、独立的和快速的争端解决机制。新的争端解决机制显然背离了传统的以外交方式解决争端的做法，这种做法基本依赖于将协商和谈判作为解决贸易争端的主要工具。
《欧盟-乌克兰DCFTA》争端解决机制提供了一种现代的“准司法”争端解决模式，该模式自2000年以来已被纳入欧盟的所有自由贸易协定，主要基于《WTO争端解决谅解》。
范围
除另有明确规定外，争端解决机制的规定适用于任何有关《欧盟-乌克兰DCFTA》条款的解释和适用的争端。根据《欧盟-乌克兰联合协定》第52条，《欧盟-乌克兰DCFTA》的以下条款被排除在争端解决机制的管辖权之外：
（1）贸易救济：全球保障措施，关于乘用车的保障措施，反倾销和反补贴措施；
（2）反垄断和并购；
（3）贸易和可持续发展。
《欧盟-乌克兰联合协定》还包含有关近似监管的争端解决机制的具体规定。如上所述，根据《欧盟-乌克兰联合协定》，乌克兰承诺适用、实施或将一套预先确定的欧盟法律纳入其国内立法。就有关近似管制的规定的解释和适用发生争端的，不得由仲裁庭裁定，而应请求欧盟法院就该问题作出裁定。欧盟法院的裁定对仲裁庭具有约束力。并入《欧盟-乌克兰联合协定》的欧盟法的法律解释问题将通过初步裁定程序提交到欧盟法院，这种机制有助于确保对被并入的欧盟法的统一解释。
最后，应当指出的是，仲裁庭的裁定不具有直接效力，因“（仲裁庭的裁定）不得为自然人或法人创设任何权利或义务”。
磋商
当就DCFTA的解释和适用发生争议时，争端解决机制规定首先应真诚地协商，以达成一致同意的方案。一方可以通过书面形式向另一方请求磋商确定争议的措施及其认为适用的协议条款。除非当事人另有约定，磋商应当在收到请求之日起30天内，在被申请人的领土内进行。
磋商阶段非常重要，因为它使当事人有机会就一个具体问题进行集中（和相对非正式的）讨论，并有机会澄清事实和收集所有相关数据，以便在确定当事人的进一步诉讼战略之前仔细评估案件优势。对于被申请人而言，通过磋商试图说服另一方当事人相信全部或部分请求不值得进入进一步的诉讼阶段，可以很好地避免诉讼（并降低解决争端的成本）。
仲裁庭的组成
当事人协商解决不成的，申请人可以请求组成仲裁庭。《欧盟-乌克兰联合协定》提供了标准的审理范围书，授权仲裁庭：“审查组成仲裁庭的请求所述事项，就有关措施是否符合本协定作出裁定……并根据本协定第310条作出裁定。”
双方当事人均有权请求组成仲裁庭，仲裁庭由三名仲裁员组成。根据《欧盟-乌克兰联合协定》的设想，应设立一个由15名（具有一方国籍的国民各5名，不具有任何一方国籍的国民5名）具有法律和国际贸易方面的专业知识或经验的仲裁员组成的常设名单。该程序不同于WTO的争端解决机制，后者需要从公开名册中临时选择仲裁员。首席仲裁员将从不具有任何一方国籍的国民指定。当事人不能就仲裁庭的组成达成一致的，仲裁庭成员将通过抽签方式从仲裁员名册中选出。
重要的是，当事人不能通过拒绝指定仲裁员而阻碍仲裁程序的启动。这一重要特征将目前的争端解决机制与之前的主要在伙伴关系与合作协定（PCA）框架下的外交型争端解决机制区别开来，在后一种机制中，一方当事人可以显著地拖延和/或拒绝指定仲裁员，并有效地阻碍后续审理。
仲裁庭的中期报告
在仲裁庭组成之日起90天内，仲裁庭必须向当事人作出一份中期报告，该报告须载有事实认定、有关规定的适用性以及任何认定和建议背后的基本理由。在某些情况下，因具体原因不能在90天期限出具时，可以延长期限，但无论如何不得迟于仲裁庭组成之日起120天作出中期报告。在中期报告作出之日起14天内，任何一方当事人均可向仲裁庭提出书面请求，请求其对中期报告的具体内容进行审查。
仲裁庭裁定
仲裁庭必须在其组成之日起120天内，将其裁定通知当事人和贸易委员会。在延长期限时，无论如何应在仲裁庭组成之日起150天内作出通知。
《欧盟-乌克兰联合协定》的上述仲裁程序比WTO争端解决机制的仲裁程序快得多（即150天）。在WTO 争端解决机制中，从仲裁庭组成到争端解决机构通过仲裁庭报告的期限为9个月。
还应指出的是，《欧盟-乌克兰联合协定》未规定上诉程序，这是其与WTO争端解决机制相比的另一个显著特点，在WTO 争端解决机制中，上诉机构可以支持、修改或推翻仲裁庭的法律认定和结论。
履行和救济
各方当事人均有义务采取必要措施，以善意遵守仲裁庭的裁定，当事人将努力就履行裁定的时间达成一致。在收到仲裁庭的通知之日起30天内，履行方应将其认为履行所需的合理期间通知另一方当事人和贸易委员会。履行方有义务在合理期限终止前将其为履行仲裁裁定而采取的任何措施通知申请人和贸易委员会。
对所通知的措施的存在或一致性有异议的，申请人可以请求原仲裁庭就该事项作出裁定。仲裁庭必须在请求提交之日起45天内通知其裁定的结果。
如果未能就赔偿达成协议，申请人有权在相当于违约行为所造成的利益丧失（或减损）的范围内，中止履行因《欧盟-乌克兰DCFTA》所载任何条款而产生的义务。
《欧盟-乌克兰联合协定》争端解决机制规定的上述履行程序与WTO争端解决机制规定的履行程序大体相似。在WTO 争端解决机制中，先通过谈判为履行设定一个截止期限，以15个月为基准。在截止期限之前，履行方必须报告其行动，如果在截止期限之前未履行，争端解决机构可以授权申请人在相当于利益丧失（或减损）的范围内中止让步或中止履行WTO下的其他义务。如就履行发生争端，该争端必须根据WTO 争端解决机制解决，并（在可能的情况下）提交原仲裁庭解决。
调解机制
《欧盟-乌克兰联合协定》提供了独立的调解机制，允许当事人通过有关非关税措施的市场准入问题的全面和快速的程序，寻求双方一致同意的解决方案。调解程序的目的不在于审查措施的合法性，而在于寻找一种不诉诸诉讼的对特定市场准入问题的快速有效的解决方案（调解机制不排除使用争端解决机制的可能性）。这个机制的运行需要指定一名可在60天内提出无约束力方案的调解员。
关于WTO在这方面的实践，如果“争端当事人”同意，WTO争端解决机制第5条提供了斡旋、调解或调停的可能性。然而，因唯一已知的根据WTO争端解决机制第5条进行的调解（以取代正式的争端解决程序的启动），发生在2002年的一项争端（该争端涉及欧洲共同体给予金枪鱼罐头的关税优惠）之前，因而第5条从未在正在进行的争端中使用。
与WTO争端解决机制和WTO法律体系的关系
在争端解决过程中，通常有三种选择：优先考虑FTA争端解决机制，优先考虑WTO或其他程序；或者允许当事人选择其中一种，但禁止再次诉讼。
如果让申请人在WTO和FTA之间选择，大多数申请人会选择WTO，这也是FTA争端如此少的原因之一。通常认为，申请人选择WTO有以下几个原因：大量的案件、对争端可能产生的结果有更大的可预测性、严格的履行义务和执行机制、上诉程序以及动员第三方支持的可能性。
《欧盟-乌克兰联合协定》争端解决机制排除了根据《WTO协定》和《欧盟-乌克兰联合协定》进行平行、并存或重复的争端解决程序的可能性。事实上，如果一方当事人就某一特定措施已根据《欧盟-乌克兰联合协定》争端解决机制或《WTO协定》提起争端解决程序，则在第一个程序结束前，不得就同一措施提起另外的争端解决程序。此外，一方当事人不得同时就《欧盟-乌克兰联合协定》和《WTO协定》下的相同义务寻求平行救济。争端解决程序一旦启动，当事人不得在另一机制就另一协议项下的相同义务寻求救济，除非所选机制因程序或管辖权原因未能对寻求救济的请求作出认定。在撰写本文时，欧盟和乌克兰未根据《WTO争端解决谅解》提起任何争端解决程序，因此，当事人将如何处理争端的管辖权选择问题仍有待观察。
关于WTO现有的法律体系，必须指出的是，当《欧盟-乌克兰联合协定》下的义务与WTO协定下的义务相同时，仲裁庭应采用与WTO争端解决机构的裁定中确定的任何相关解释一致的解释。
总结
随着《欧盟-乌克兰联合协定》于2017年9月1日生效，只有时间能证明，欧盟与乌克兰之间的贸易争端是否会诉诸于新的争端解决机制。然而，在这个早期阶段，有必要强调的是，《欧盟-乌克兰联合协定》规定的争端解决机制制定了一套新的、先进的争端解决机制，可以有效地避免和解决贸易争端。
显然，欧盟和乌克兰之间可能出现贸易摩擦（最近欧盟批评乌克兰已采取的或在立法程序中可能采取的措施，就证明了这一点），在这种情况下，《欧盟-乌克兰联合协定》争端解决机制为当事人提供了一种有序的争端解决方式。只有时间能证明，当事人究竟将求助于《欧盟-乌克兰联合协定》下的新争端解决机制，还是更愿意采用已经熟悉，同时也提供秘书处制度框架和上诉可能性的WTO争端解决机制。
《欧盟-乌克兰联合协定》争端解决机制中某些章节（如保障措施和反倾销措施）被排除在外，直接将此类争端的解决专门提交WTO。此外，欧盟法在近似监管事项上的解释，需要参考欧盟法院的初步裁定，因而《欧盟-乌克兰联合协定》争端解决机制对于该解释不具有管辖权。
同时，当某些权利和义务仅在《欧盟-乌克兰联合协定》中规定和设立时，例如优惠的市场准入或优惠的原产地规则，一些事项可以专门通过《欧盟-乌克兰联合协定》争端解决机制处理。
最后，必须指出的是，《欧盟-乌克兰联合协定》争端解决机制也是必要的，以确保《欧盟-乌克兰联合协定》所列承诺能够得到遵守。事实上，从任何自由贸易协定中互利互惠的经济期望建立在充分遵守协定义务的基础之上。通过执行和有效的争端解决机制确保《欧盟-乌克兰联合协定》能得到遵守，是该协定取得成效的关键。
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 【英文原文】
Dispute Settlement Mechanism under the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement
 
Introduction
The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (hereinafter: “EU-Ukraine AA” or “AA”) is widely considered to be “the most ambitious agreement the European Union has ever offered to a non-Member State.[1]
Of particular significance is the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA),which forms an integral part of the EU-Ukraine AA and which covers substantially all trade between the EU and Ukraine aiming at the highest possible degree of liberalization by including legally binding legislative approximation commitments. The DCFTA chapters cover substantive provisions on trade liberalization and economic integration but also contain a number of horizontal mechanisms.
One of the most important horizontal mechanisms of the DCFTA is, in my view, the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM). The main focus of this article is to analyse how the DCFTA DSM is expected to function and what are the similarities and differences of this new dispute settlement mechanism when compared with the widely used dispute settlement mechanism under the WTO. 
General provisions of the Dispute Settlement Mechanisms under EU-Ukraine AA
A dispute settlement mechanism forms part of the overall structure of the EU-Ukraine AA and its inclusion into the Agreement is crucial because there will inevitably be disagreements concerning the scope and the nature of the commitments that both Parties have made. Obviously, international trade rules are effective when they are properly applied. Therefore, dispute settlement mechanisms are set up in most trade agreements to ensure that the agreements can be enforced and that disputes can be settled effectively.
Almost all Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) rely in practice on one of the three general types of dispute settlement mechanisms: 
-diplomatic settlement by negotiation;
-judgments by standing tribunals;
-the World Trade Organization (WTO) model, in which a panel is established to hear and adjudicate a dispute. 
The currently dominant model for FTAs dispute settlement is based on the WTO’s dispute settlement system (originally developed under GATT). The WTO’s dispute settlement procedures have formed expectations of the governments concerning reliable dispute settlement and enforcement system in trade agreements. Therefore, the FTAs negotiations have frequently resorted to the WTO-like system as the basis for the dispute settlement system in FTAs.
The objective of the EU-Ukraine DCFTA DSM is set out clearly: “to avoid and settle,in good faith, any dispute between the Parties […] and to arrive at a mutually agreed solution wherever possible”.[2]
Atthe outset, it has to be mentioned that for the disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the non-DCFTA provisions of the EU-Ukraine AA, a standard dispute settlement mechanism is provided in accordance with Article 477 of the EU-Ukraine AA. This mechanism provides that the Association Council can settle disputes after consultations by issuing a binding decision.In cases, when an agreement cannot be reached within the Association Council after a three-month period, the complaining party may take “appropriate measures”. Article 478 of the EU-Ukraine AA specifies that in selection of appropriate measures, priority shall be given to those which least disturb the functioning of the AA. Such measures may not include the suspension of any rights or obligations provided for under the provisions of the EU-Ukraine DCFTA.[3]
The most innovative and advanced elements of the dispute settlement under the EU-Ukraine AA concern with the way disputes are to be settled with regard to the interpretation and application of the DCFTA provisions. Indeed, Chapter 14 of Title IV provides the basis for a new, separate and prompt DSM. The new DSM clearly departs from the traditional diplomatic approach to dispute settlement which essentially relied on consultations and negotiations as the main tools in order to solve a trade dispute.
The EU-Ukraine DCFTA DSM provides for a modern and “quasi-judicial” model of dispute settlement which has been inserted in all FTAs of the EU since 2000[4] and which is largely based on the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).[5]
Scope
The provisions of the DSM apply to any dispute concerning the interpretation and application of the provisions of the EU-Ukraine DCFTA, except when other wiseexpressly provided.[6] According to Article 52 of the EU-Ukraine AA, the following sections of the EU-Ukraine DCFTA have been excluded from the jurisdiction of the DSM:
-Trade Remedies: global safeguard measures, safeguard measures on passengercars, anti-dumping and countervailing measures;[7]
-Anti-trust and mergers;[8]
-Trade and Sustainable Development;[9]
The EU-Ukraine AA also provides specific DSM provisions relating to regulatory approximation.[10] As mentioned above, under the EU-Ukraine AA, Ukraine has undertaken to apply, implement or incorporate in its domestic legislation a pre-determined set of EU laws. In case when a dispute would arise concerning the interpretation and application of the provisions relating to regulatory approximation, [11] the arbitration panel shall not decide the question, but request the Court of Justice of the EU to give a ruling on the question. The ruling of the Court of Justice of the EU will be binging on the arbitration panel. This mechanism whereby the questions of the legal interpretation of the EU acquis incorporated into the EU-Ukraine AA are directed to the EU Court viathe preliminary ruling procedure is crucial for ensuring homogeneous interpretation of the incorporated EU acquis.
Finally,it should be noted that the rulings of the arbitration panels do not have direct effect since it is provided that the “[the arbitration panel rulings] shall not create any rights or obligations for natural or legal persons”. [12]
Consultations
When there is a dispute regarding the interpretation and application of DCFTA, the DSM provides that the Parties shall first enter into consultations in good faith with the aim of reaching a mutually agreed solution. A Party may seek consultations by means of a written request to the other Party identifying the measure at issue and the provisions of the Agreement that it considers applicable. Consultations shall be held within 30 days [13]of the date of receipt of the request and shall take place, unless the Parties agree otherwise, in the territory of the Party complaint against. [14]
A consultation stage is important because it gives the Parties an opportunity to have a focused (and relatively informal) discussion about a specific issue.Consultations are also important because they provide a good opportunity to clarify the facts and to gather all the relevant data in order to carefully evaluate the strength of the case before determining a Party’s further litigation strategy. For the responding Party, consultations may also offer a good opportunity to avoid litigation (and reduce dispute settlement costs) by trying to convince the other Party that some or all of the claims are not worth bringing to further litigation stage.
Establishment of the arbitration panel
If the parties have failed to resolve the dispute by recourse to consultations,the complaining party may request establishment of an arbitration panel. The EU-Ukraine AA provides the standard terms of reference of the arbitration panel: “to examine the matter referred to in the request for establishment of the arbitration panel, to rule on the compatibility of the measure in question with the provisions of this Agreement […] and to make a ruling in accordance with Article 310 of this Agreement”.
Both Parties have the right to establish an arbitration panel, which is composed of three arbitrators. A permanent list of 15 arbitrators is envisaged under the EU-Ukraine AA (five from each of the Parties and five who are nationals of either Party) with specialized knowledge or experience of law and international trade.[15] The procedure is different from the WTO DSU which relies on ad hoc selection of the arbitrators (panelists) from an open roster. Chairperson of the arbitration panel will be appointed from the nationals of either Party. Incase the Parties cannot agree on the composition of the panel, it is provided that the panelists will be drawn by lot from the list of the arbitrators.
Importantly,the Parties cannot block the initiation of the arbitration procedures by refusing to appoint an arbitrator. This important characteristic feature distinguishes the present DSM from the previous, predominantly diplomatic DSM in the framework of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) where one party could significantly delay and/or refuse appointment of arbitrators and effectively block subsequent adjudication.
Interim Panel Report
The arbitration panel must issue to the Parties its interim report setting out the findings of the facts, the applicability of the relevant provisions and the basic rationale behind any findings and recommendations within 90 days of the date of establishment of the arbitration panel (in certain cases when it is nopossible to respect the 90 days deadline due specific reasons, an extension is possible but in no circumstances should an interim report be issued later than 120 days of the date of establishment of the arbitration panel). Any Party may submit a written request for the arbitration panel to review precise aspects of the interim report within 14 days of its issuance.[16]
Arbitration Panel Ruling
The arbitration panel must notify its ruling to the Parties and to the Trade Committee within 120 days of the date of establishment of the arbitration panel (with possibility of extension but under no circumstances should the ruling be notified later than 150 days from the date of establishment of the arbitration panel. [17]
The above-described arbitration procedure under the EU-Ukraine AA is significantly more expedite (i.e. 150 days) than that under the WTO DSU which sets a nine months deadline from the panel establishment to adoption of the panel report by the Dispute Settlement Body. 
It should also be noted that the EU-Ukraine AA does not provide for an appellate procedure which is another distinctive feature when compared to the WTO DSU where the Appellate Body can uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of a panel.
Compliance and remedies
Each Party is obliged to take measures necessary in order to comply in good faith with arbitration panel ruling, and the Parties will endeavor to agree on the period of time to comply with the ruling. The complying Party has 30 days after the notification of the arbitration panel to notify the other Party and the Trade Committee about the reasonable period of time it considers necessary for compliance. The complying Party is then obliged to notify the complaining Party and the Trade Committee before the end of the reasonable time of any measure it has taken to comply with the arbitration ruling.
In case of disagreement concerning the existence or consistency of the notified measure, the complaining Party may request the original arbitration panel to rule on the matter. The arbitration panel must notify its ruling within 45 days of the date of submission of the request. 
If no agreement on compensation is reached, the complaining Party is entitled to suspend obligations arising from any provision contained in the EU-Ukraine DCFTA at a level equivalent to the nullification or impairment caused by the violation.[18]
The above-described compliance procedure under the EU-Ukraine AA DSM is largely similar to that under the WTO DSU where the compliance begins with setting a deadline for compliance through negotiations with a 15-month benchmark for the compliance deadline. During the period before the deadline, the complying party must report on its actions and in case compliance has not taken place before the deadline, the Dispute Settlement Body may authorize the complainant to suspend concessions or other obligations under the WTO, in an amount equivalent to the nullification (or impairment).  Incase there is a dispute concerning compliance, it must be settled under the WTO DSU with recourse to the original panel (whenever possible).
Mediation mechanism
A separate mediation mechanism is provided that allows the Parties to seek mutuallyagreed solutions through a comprehensive and expeditious procedure concerningmarket access issues concerning non-tariff measures.[19] The purpose of themediation procedure is not to review the legality of a measure, but rather tofind a prompt and effective solution to a particular market access issue without recourse to litigation (the mediation mechanism does not exclude the possibility to have recourse to dispute settlement).[20] This mechanism functions through an appointment of a mediator who can advise and propose a non-binding solution within 60 days.[21]
As for the WTO practice in this regard, Article 5 of the WTO DSU provides for the possibility of good offices, mediation or conciliation, if agreed to by “the parties to a dispute”, which implies that a dispute exists. However, Article 5 has never been used during an on-going dispute since the only known resort to mediation under the said Article under the WTO DSU took place prior to the dispute, i.e. in 2002 concerning the European Community tariff preferences for canned tuna instead of initiating formal dispute settlement proceedings.
Relationship with the WTO DSU and the WTO jurisprudence
There are normally three options for dealing with forum shopping in dispute settlement: give precedence for the FTA DSM, give precedence to the WTO or other proceedings; or allow the parties to choose but prohibit re-litigation.
Given a choice between brining a dispute under the WTO or under a FTA, most complainants choose the WTO, which is one of the reasons why there are so few FTAs disputes. It is generally perceived that complainants prefer the WTO for a number of reasons: significant number of cases, greater level of predictability about the likely outcome of the dispute, strong compliance obligations and enforcement mechanisms, appellate procedures and the possibility to mobilize third-party support.
The EU-Ukraine AA DSM excludes the possibility of parallel, concomitant or repetitive dispute settlement procedures under the WTO Agreement and under the EU-Ukraine AA DSM. Indeed, where a Party has, with regard to a particular measure, instituted a dispute settlement proceeding, either under the EU-Ukraine AA DSM or under the WTO Agreement, it may not institute a dispute settlement proceeding regarding the same measure in the other forum until the first proceeding has been concluded. In addition, a Party shall not seek redress of an obligation which is identical under the EU-Ukraine AA and under the WTO Agreement in the two forums. Once a dispute settlement procedure has been initiated,[22] the Party shall not bring a claim seeking redress of the identical obligation under the other Agreement to the other forum, unless the forum selected fails for procedural or jurisdictional reasons to make findings on the claim seeking redress of that obligation. At the moment of writing of the present article, no dispute has been initiated under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding between the EU and Ukraine it is therefore remains to be seen how the issue of jurisdictional choice of a dispute will be addressed by the Parties.
With regard to the existing WTO jurisprudence, it must be mentioned that in cases where an obligation under the EU-Ukraine AA is identical to an obligation under the WTO Agreement, the arbitration panel shall adopt an interpretation which is consistent with any relevant interpretation established in rulings of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.
Concluding remarks
With the entry into force of the EU-Ukraine AA on 1 September 2017, only time will tell whether its new DSM will be resorted to in order to resolve trade disputes between the EU and Ukraine. However, already at this early stage it is important to emphasize that the DSM provided in the EU-Ukraine AA sets out a new and advanced system of dispute settlement which could be used to effectively avoid and resolve trade disputes.
Clearly, trade frictions between the EU and Ukraine could arise (as recently evidenced by the EU criticism of certain measures already adopted or in the legislative process for potential adoption by Ukraine) and in such circumstances the EU-Ukraine AA DSM provides for an orderly manner for the Parties to settle their disputes. Only time will tell whether the Parties would actually resort to the new DSM mechanism under the EU-Ukraine AA or would rather prefer the WTO dispute settlement system, which is already familiar and which also offers an institutional framework of the Secretariat and possibility of an appeal.[23]   
Exclusion of some of the Chapters from the EU-Ukraine AA DSM such as safeguard and anti-dumping measures directs settlement of the disputes on such matters exclusively to the WTO. Also, the EU-Ukraine AA DSM will have no jurisdiction over interpretation of the EU acquis in regulatory approximation matters since in such cases a reference for a preliminary ruling by the Court of Justice would be required.
Atthe same time, a number of issues could exclusively be dealt through the EU-Ukraine AA DSM in circumstances when certain rights and obligations are only provided for and established by the EU-Ukraine AA such as, for instance, preferential market access or preferential rules of origin. 
Finally,it must be pointed out that the EU-Ukraine AA DSM is also needed in order to ensure that the promises and commitments set out in the EU-Ukraine AA are maintained. Indeed, economic expectations of the mutual benefits from any FreeTrade Agreement are based on the assumption of full compliance with the Agreement’s obligations. Ensuring compliance through enforcement and efficient dispute settlement mechanism is essential for the EU-Ukraine AA gains to materialize.
By Yuriy Rudyuk
***
[1]H. Van Rompuy “Remarks by President of the European Council at the press conference of the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius”, 29 November 2013.
[2]Art. 303 EU-Ukraine AA
[3]Exceptions apply to violations by a Party of the essential elements of the EU-Ukraine DCFTA (see Article 478, para. 3).
[4]The new model of the DSM was the first time included in 2000 (EU-MexicoFTA).  Garcia Barcero (2006), a negotiator for the European Commission, surveys the development of the Commission’s thinking on dispute settlement in trade agreements, starting withthe traditional diplomatic approach seen in the EU’s association agreements and other agreements before 2000, and discusses why the Commission’s preferences have shifted toward ad hoc arbitration procedures in the FTAs with Mexico and Chile.
[5]Understanding on Rules and procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes.
[6]Art. 304 EU-Ukraine AA
[7]Art. 52 EU-Ukraine AA
[8]Art. 261 EU-Ukraine AA
[9]Art. 300 (7) EU-Ukraine AA
[10]Art. 322 EU-Ukraine
[11]This concerns the following Chapters of the Agreement: Chapter 1 (Technical Barriers to Trade), Chapter 4 (Sanitary and phytosanitary Measures), Chapter 5 (Customs and Trade Facilitation), Chapter 6 ( Establishment, Trade and Services and Electronic Commerce), Chapter 8 (public Procurement) and Chapter 10 (Competition).
[12]Art. 321 EU-Ukraine AA
[13]Consultations on matters of urgency shall be held within 15 days (Art. 305(4)) and even quicker, i.e. within 3 days on matters concerning transport of energy goods through networks (Art. 305(5)).
[14]The Parties may continue consultations at the latest stages of dispute settlement and may reach a mutually agreed solution to a dispute at any time.They should notify the Trade Committee and the chairperson of the arbitration panel of any such solution.
[15]All arbitrators appointed to serve on an arbitration panel shall be independent, serve in their individual capacity and not take instructions fromany organization or government, or be affiliated with the government of any of the Parties, and shall comply with the Code of conduct set out in Annex XXV to this Agreement. For the details on the appointment of the arbitrators from Ukraine, see Decree of the President of Ukraine No298/2017 of 29 September 2017“On appointment of representatives of Ukraine to the arbitration groups in the framework of the dispute settlement procedures in accordance with article 306 and 307 of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union and European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States”.   
[16]As it is the case with the consultation stage, shorter deadlines are set for issuance of the Interim Report and questions from the Parties on certain aspects of the Report: half the standard time for the disputes involving seasonal or perishable goods and 20 days and 5 days respectively for the disputes concerning trade in energy matters (Art 308(2) and 308 (3)).
[17]Disputes involving seasonal or perishable goods again are subject to a shorter deadline for the arbitration panel ruling, i.e. 60 days with the maximum extension to 75 days from the date of establishment of the panel. Even a shorter deadline has been set for issuance of the arbitration panel ruling for the trade in energy related disputes, i.e. 40 days from the date of establishment of the arbitration panel with no possibility of an extension(Art. 310 (2) and 310(3)).
[18]In suspending obligations, the complaining Party may choose to increase its tariff rates to the level applied to other WTO Members on a volume of trade to be determined in such a way that the volume of trade multiplied by the increase of the tariff rates equals to the value of the nullification or impairment caused by the violation (Art. 315(3)).
[19]Art. 324 EU-Ukraine AA.
[20]Art. 333 EU-Ukraine AA.
[21]Art. 331 EU-Ukraine AA
[22]For the dispute settlement proceedings under the WTO Agreement, the proceedings are deemed to be initiated by a Party’s request for the establishment of a panel under Article 6 of the WTO DSU. For the dispute settlement proceedings under the EU-Ukraine AA, the proceedings are deemed to be initiated by a Party’s request for establishment of an arbitration panel under Article 306(1) of the Agreement.
[23]Also, the costs of the WTO DSM are already paid by the Parties’ respective WTOcontributions whereas the costs for the DSM under the EU-Ukraine AA are to beborne by the Parties.
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